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failed to match naval strategy to national
security requirements. The result was an
impressive fleet designed to defeat another major navy rapidly in blue-water
action, when a more flexible force capable of securing and defending vital maritime interests might have served Japan
better. The force structure and mentality
of the IJN led to dramatic success for
Japan in the early stages of World War II,
but those gains could not be sustained,
and Japan’s poorly guarded sea lines of
communication became a vulnerability
that American submarines exploited to
decimate Japan’s merchant marine and
undermine the Japanese economy.
As a direct result of this experience,
writes Patalano, the founders of the
JMSDF sought to ensure that Japan’s new
navy would have a broad, maritime focus
rather than a narrow naval one, and that
new generations of naval leaders would
anchor their maritime strategies in
Japan’s national policy objectives. These
leaders also worked to make the JMSDF
immune to the internal rivalries that
wracked the IJN in the 1930s by centralizing the JMSDF’s command functions
under a single Maritime Staff Office
reporting to a single chief of maritime
staff firmly under the control of civilian
bureaucrats. The JMSDF’s study of the
IJN’s failure to secure its sea lines of
communication during World War II
influenced the prioritization of sea-lane
defense during the Cold War. Additionally, interservice rivalries that weakened
the efforts of the Imperial Japanese
Army and Navy during World War II
were addressed postwar by the consolidation of initial officer training to foster
interservice cooperation and camaraderie. Yet the IJN is more than a mere
cautionary tale—its esprit de corps and
traditions live on in the modern JMSDF.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015

NWC_Autumn2015Reivew.indb 133

B O O K R E V I E WS

133

Patalano’s outstanding work falters only
when the author attempts to explain
the JMSDF’s current tactics as a function of its IJN heritage. While the IJN’s
influence on the JMSDF is undeniably
proven by the book’s analysis, the links
between the JMSDF’s identity and its
tactics are not clearly traced. It is the
reviewers’ experience and assessment
that JMSDF tactics are generally either
adopted directly from the United States
or the product of analytical efforts to
maximize the effectiveness of the force’s
combat systems vis-à-vis perceived
threats. While it is logical that culture
and identity elements are strong influences on those analytical processes,
Patalano’s argument lacks tangible
examples to delineate this connection
clearly. The link between JMSDF strategic culture and IJN heritage is clear,
but the relationship between the IJN
and modern JMSDF tactics is tenuous.
Well articulated, broad in scope, and
drawing on sources not previously accessed by Western researchers, Patalano’s
work delves into previously unexplored
territory essential to making sense of
Japanese decision making in the maritime domain. Given rapidly developing
events in East Asian waters, Post-war
Japan as a Sea Power deserves attention from anyone seeking to understand
maritime affairs in the Asia-Pacific.
CARLOS ROSENDE AND JOHN BRADFORD

Oliver, Dave. Against the Tide: Rickover’s Leadership Principles and the Rise of the Nuclear Navy.
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2014.
178pp. $27.95

Hyman Rickover almost single-handedly
delivered nuclear power to the United
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States Navy and, when this was combined with submarine and missile
technology, gave the United States the
assured second-strike capability that was
the bedrock of Cold War deterrence.
Rickover also ruled his nuclear navy for
decades, setting unrivaled standards
for safety and performance while also
becoming one of the most controversial
military officers of the twentieth century.
Dave Oliver, a retired rear admiral and
veteran submariner who joined the Navy
in the nuclear navy’s adolescence, had a
career that provided him both a unique
opportunity to observe Hyman Rickover,
and a chance to think deeply about what
might be referred to as “the Rickover
method.” This book purports to examine
that method, with a particular emphasis on Rickover’s leadership style and
how he changed naval and submarine
culture. Oliver does this by focusing
on large themes, such as “planning for
success,” and “innovation and change.”
He populates each chapter with descriptions of Rickover in action and more
than a few personal anecdotes that in
some cases simply beggar the imagination. The result is a fast-paced volume
that reads much more like a memoir
than a scholarly study of leadership or
management. From this perspective,
Against the Tide is a success. The book
also has value as a window into a branch
of the Navy that, for reasons good, bad,
and inevitable, was insulated, isolated,
and opaque to most outside observers.
Readers who approach this work with
the hope of learning how to achieve
similar results to Admiral Rickover’s will
be disappointed. In part this is due to
Rickover’s unique story, his consistent
refusal to produce any form of comprehensive autobiography or memoir, and
the complexity of his career. Rickover
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is a hard man to understand truly and
perhaps impossible to replicate. Oliver
points out that Rickover himself occasionally deviated from his own first
principles, but fails to explain why that
happened. In another case Oliver argues
that Rickover was able to anticipate the
future far more accurately than almost
all his peers, but offers no suggestion
about how this gift might be replicated.
Here too, questions arise. One of the
examples used to demonstrate this prescience involved the admiral pulling an
answer for a technical problem from a
stack of solutions, written long ago, that
he kept in his desk. The scene is dramatic, but leaves the obvious question;
if Admiral Rickover, with his ability to
anticipate the future, foresaw the problem, why didn’t he fix it beforehand? In
another example, toward the end of the
book Admiral Oliver offers the observation that “hard work and focus can succeed for anyone.” Yet in earlier chapters
he makes a very convincing argument
that Rickover’s controversial interviews
and ruthless “culling of the herd” of
prospective and serving nuclear officers
was warranted because some of those
men, including one from his own wardroom, no matter how hardworking and
focused, lacked what it took to be a successful officer on a nuclear submarine.
Oliver, when all is said and done, openly
admires Admiral Rickover. He tries to
maintain a balanced approach when
it comes to identifying and analyzing
Rickover’s blind spots and personal
weaknesses but still minimizes some of
Rickover’s less commendable attributes
—while engaging in occasional hyperbole when it comes to describing
the admiral’s detractors. For example,
Oliver refers to Admiral Rickover’s
“adversaries” as “attacking with the
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viciousness and mindlessness of a pack
of stray dogs.” The imagery is bold,
but the truth is that, as later described
by Oliver, some of those adversaries
were principled officers with different and often broader portfolios and
perspectives whose opposition to
Rickover was anything but mindless.
To its credit, this book touches on and
invites thought and discussion about
more than a few attributes of senior
leadership, including personal accountability. Rickover was quick to dismiss
subordinates who he felt had failed his
program—yet the degree to which he
would be willing to sacrifice his own
position and power is less clear, particularly when even many of his supporters
feel the admiral clung to power too long
and eventually became a detriment to
the program he had created. Another
area involves personal and professional
ethics. Oliver seems to make the point
that when the stakes are high enough,
the ends do justify the means and a successful outcome justifies questionable or
even illegal actions. This invites a subsequent discussion involving the deepest
questions of what it is to be an officer
and member of the profession of arms.
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of
Admiral Oliver’s book is the revelation that the author identifies Admiral
Rickover as a manager and not a leader,
contrary to what Rickover desired and
believed. Today, Admiral Rickover is
among the leadership biographic cases
senior students study at the Naval War
College and the question—Was he a
leader or manager?—always comes up.
While there are some students who agree
with Admiral Oliver, the majority identify Rickover as a leader. However, all
are agreed Rickover should be credited
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for daring greatly, building to last, and
being most worthy of continued study.
RICHARD J. NORTON

Dubbs, Chris. America’s U-boats: Terror Trophies
of World War I. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press,
2014. 206pp. $24.95

Chris Dubbs, a Gannon University
executive, followed a fascination with his
discovery of a First World War German
submarine wreck in Lake Michigan. He
pursued meticulous research through
collections of First World War U-boat
accounts and recorded American attitudes on the war and the public fascination with submarines. Throughout the
book, he grabs the attention of readers
as he skillfully recounts the arrival of the
German freighter submarine Deutschland in the United States to reopen trade
with Germany, the horrors that U-boats
caused during the war, and the end of
the war, when the allies claimed U-boats
as war prizes. His well-cited account
of events in the United States, at sea,
and in Europe between 1916 and 1920
entertains readers with riveting images
of German submarines and crews, the
perils of war at sea, and public reaction
and debates on the war. Dubbs offers
an informative and historically accurate
description of the impact U-boats had
on the evolution of warfare and the subsequent employment of submarines as
offensive weapons in war. He concludes
his book with a note on the entrance
of the United States into the Second
World War, when Admiral Harold Stark,
Chief of Naval Operations, ordered U.S.
submarines to commence unrestricted
submarine warfare against Japan,
thereby disregarding the moral outrage
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